The effects of global warming in the Arctic region present a particular challenge for the European Union (EU), which seeks to profile itself as a leader in responding to climate change. Although the EU strives to prioritize climate protection, the Arctic region remains one of the EU's major suppliers of energy, particularly oil and gas. The EU must thus strike a balance between climate change mitigation and adaptation, and energy security. The present article analyses the developments of the EU position in this field, particularly in light of the COP 21 negotiations, and the more recent 2016 Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic. In doing so it seeks to explore to what extent the EU truly is fulfilling its own leadership aspirations in the field of climate change and energy in the Arctic.
Introduction
It is well established that the Arctic region is particularly sensitive to climate change. The Arctic states have recognized that 'the Arctic is warming considerably faster than other regions of the globe, leading to fundamental changes to the environment and human living conditions in both the Arctic and around the world' . The efforts towards mitigation and adaptation to climate change in the Arctic are particularly supported by the European Union (EU), which has taken a leading role internationally in this field. In the 2016 Joint Communication on an Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic,1 the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy clearly express their focus on climate and environmental issues in the Arctic.
This last communication represents an interesting development in the EU Arctic and energy policies when compared to previous policy documents. The interest of the EU in the Arctic has always been manifold and has progressively increased in the last fifteen years. The Arctic region remains one of the major suppliers of energy, mainly oil and gas, for the EU. The strategic importance of the Arctic region for the EU energy security clearly emerged in the policy documents of 20082 and 2012.3 The 2016 Communication represents a focus-shift in the EU Arctic policy, at least in terms of declared goals. With its increased emphasis on climate protection and research, the new 'integrated' EU Arctic Policy is strongly framed around environment and sustainability, rather than strategic geo-political interests.
The present article analyses the development of the EU positions in the field of mitigation and adaptation to climate change, and assesses them in the Arctic context. It then looks at how the EU's self-declared climate leadership is affecting the EU energy policy, specifically in relation to the management and exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic. Analyzing these trends in their broader context, this article considers the extent to which the EU truly is fulfilling its own leadership aspirations in the field of climate change and energy in the Arctic context. The EU as a Self-proclaimed Climate Leader
Over the past decades the EU has become increasingly visible as a global environmental actor, particularly in the field of climate change, where it has been keen to profile itself as a leader in climate protection.4 Indeed, as a regional organization, the EU has a unique status as an independent party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)5 and the Kyoto Protocol,6 alongside its Member States. Throughout the extensive negotiation period, the EU has sought to 'set the example' , by committing to a 20% emissions reduction target by 2020, irrespective of whether an international agreement was concluded.7 This went above the target set for the second Kyoto commitment period, and was, in the EU's own words, 'by far the most ambitious commitment by any country or group of countries in the world for the post-2012 period' .8 Leaning further on public opinion, the EU then pledged to increase its CO2 reduction target from 20% to 30% by 2020 if other major emitting countries also committed to undertake their 'fair share' of global emissions. At first glance, it may not seem entirely intuitive that the EU should have a leading role to play in climate-related Arctic policy. In geographical terms, the EU has some representation in the area, with EU Member States Denmark (Greenland), Sweden and Finland, as well as European Economic Area (EEA) members, Norway and Iceland, all having Arctic territories; however, these states remain independent actors. As a Union, the importance of the EU's role lies in its indirect contribution to climate change risks in the Arctic. Indeed, the 2010 Arctic Footprint Policy Assessment concluded that 'the EU has a significant impact on the socio-economic and environmental aspects of the Arctic region' .16 Particularly in relation to climate change, the report noted that greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted by the EU contributed to an EU footprint of 15% of the global impact in the Arctic, its final demand for products from the oil and gas industry amounting to 24%.17 More dramatically, the report also found that the EU contributed a 59% share of black carbon emissions in the region.18 As black carbon deposition increases the rate of melting in snow and ice, this should have clear policy implications for the EU's Arctic agenda. Despite its direct and indirect relationship with the Arctic, the EU is a relative newcomer to the field, only deciding to develop a Community Arctic policy in 2008.19 The main impetus for this new interest was concern regarding the impact of climate change on the 'geo-strategic dynamics' of the Arctic.20 These changing dynamics were the result of rapidly melting polar ice-caps, which continued to create new waterways and increase the accessibility of the 'enormous' hydrocarbon resources in the region. In response, the We thus see that while the development of the EU's Arctic policy was prompted by climate change, its original objectives appeared more focused on trade and resource interests than they were on environmental protection. In fact, hydrocarbon resources and their extraction are key contributors to climate change.24 In addition, although allowing maritime transport through Arctic waterways would shorten the overall transport routes, it is likely to further harm the fragile Arctic ecosystem, which in turn has knock-on effects on the global climate system.25 These conflicting interests raise the question whether the EU really has been 'leading by example' , as it proclaimed at the COP21. In analyzing this issue, the following section will examine the development of the EU's 'integrated approach' to combatting climate change in the Arctic. Union and the Arctic Region.27 As the first concern on the list, climate change was framed to feature prominently. The various proposals for action included strengthening 'cooperation on improving primary energy savings, energy efficiency and the use of renewable energies in the Arctic' , and 'strengthening international efforts to mitigate climate change' . In terms of its own contribution to the problem, the Communication noted that, 'where strategies and projects of the EU affect the Arctic' the EU should 'take account of environmental impacts before decisions are made' , and 'share experience with the Arctic states' .28 Yet, under the heading, 'promoting the sustainable use of resources' , the 2008 Communication notes its interest in the 'large untapped hydrocarbon reserves' , including those in offshore resources inside the EEZs of Arctic states. These resources could 'contribute to enhancing the EU's security of supply concerning energy and raw materials in general' .29 Exploitation would be slow, 'since it presents great challenges and entails high costs due to harsh conditions and multiple environmental risks' .30 The Communication expressed a special interest in the maintenance of a 'level playing field' and 'reciprocal market access' . At the same time, it encouraged the observance of the 'highest possible environmental standards' , as well as the 'introduction of binding international standards, building inter alia on the guidelines of the Arctic Council and relevant international conventions' .
Climate Change in the Development of the EU's Arctic Policy
The EU has thus never masked its interest in accessing energy and raw materials as a key driver for cooperation with other states. This it sought to marry with its sustainability objectives through the promotion of high environmental protection standards for marine pollution and resource extraction in international fora such as the Arctic Council and the IMO. such an approach treats the symptoms rather than the cause. Although the EU acknowledged its own role in contributing to climate change, it really only addressed this through encouraging impact assessments and resolving to assess the effectiveness of its own policies.32 Improvements in energy efficiency, renewables and emission reductions were somewhat vaguely to be achieved through 'strengthening cooperation' with other States.33 It is arguable whether the developments throughout the following years have done much to strengthen the EU's diffuse Arctic policy. More generally, the EU has struggled to secure observer status at the Arctic Council, an issue hampered by a dispute with Canada over the EU's import ban on seals and seal products.34 It also failed to garner sufficient support for its 2008 proposal for an international Arctic Treaty, which, it has been suggested 'was perceived by some as being dismissive of the sovereign rights of the eight Arctic states' .35 Furthermore, 'the Commission's pursuit of an 'enhanced role' in Arctic governance' gave some the impression of being 'both ignorant and overly assertive' .36 Looking at more specific policy documents, the Commission and High few substantive changes, and has been criticized as 'statements of fact rather than commitments to action, which appear to be in great part a continuation or intensification of existing activities at EU, bilateral or multilateral level' .37
The more recent 2014 European Parliament Resolution on the EU Strategy for the Arctic emphasizes the 'economic opportunities and the variety of industries in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions' , including 'tourism, maritime industry and shipping, renewable energy […] gas and oil, offshore industry, forestry and wood-based industries, mining [and] transport services' . Not all of these industries are equally conducive to climate protection. Notably, the 2014 Resolution does make indirect reference to the EU's influence on climate change in the Arctic, recalling 'the position of the EU as a main consumer of Arctic natural gas' .38 However, it considers this to be 'an important bridge element for the shift to a low-carbon economy in the future' . Although natural gas does emit far less CO2 than oil or coal if combusted under the correct conditions, it remains a key fossil fuel contributing to climate change.39 Importantly, the drilling and extraction of natural gas may also lead to 'fugitive' methane emissions, which are in fact 34 times stronger than CO2 emissions at trapping heat over a hundred-year period.40 The safety of natural gas extraction is therefore vital to any claimed benefits over other energy sources, such as coal. This appears to be recognized by the Resolution's requirement that natural gas be sourced from 'safe and secure supply and produced according to the highest possible standards' .41 The EU's independent role in ensuring the safety of offshore oil and gas operations is discussed further below. The EU further 'supports the step-by-step precautionary approach in the development of 37 Although these statements endeavour to provide checks and balances, they remain quite vague in content, without providing a clear indication of how they should be translated into the EU's own policy. The In setting out the mitigation and adaptation strategies, the 2016 Communication reiterates the EU's pledge under the Paris Agreement to achieve a 40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.52 It also reaffirms the EU's commitment to spend 20% of its budget on climaterelated activities. It does not, however, specify to what extent these overarching reduction commitments will be directed towards the Arctic region. In this regard, it appears that the EU is waiting on other actors, being 'ready to work with Arctic States, indigenous peoples and the relevant regional and multilateral fora' , to develop an 'ambitious climate adaptation agenda for the Arctic 47 JOIN (2016) The 2016 Communication does mention oil and gas activities, with regard to which the EU is 'committed to working closely with Member States, the OSPAR Convention and other stakeholders' .55 However, this cooperation is directed at promoting the adoption of 'the highest standards of major accident prevention and environmental control' , and not specifically at the regulation of consumption from the Arctic region. This was something of a disappointment from an environmental perspective. The director of the Global Arctic Program at the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Alexander Shestakov, for example, was 'expecting the E.U. to say that it did not want oil and gas from the Arctic and that it was not interested in supporting E.U.-based companies doing those projects in the Arctic' .56 There is also a lack of explicit support for a ban on the use of heavy fuel oil by the shipping sector in the Arctic, which, as noted by Shestakov, is a program already adopted by the Arctic Council.57 In March 2017, concerned Members of the European Parliament submitted a nonbinding motion calling for a total ban on oil drilling in the Arctic;58 however, this was rejected by the European Parliament in a symbolic vote that could 'set the tone' for Brussels policy, just as Norway announced plans to open up a record number of blocks in Arctic waters for hydrocarbon exploration. 59 Another issue is that of black carbon emissions, to which, as discussed, the EU is one of the largest contributors.60 EU Member States are party to the 53 From the above analysis it appears that the EU's concrete policy suggestions may not be as ambitious as they could be. Still, the EU evidently does consider climate protection to be a core element of its Arctic policy. This is particularly clear when we look at the EU energy policy in the Arctic context. Indeed, this is one area in which the EU may have somewhat more room to manoeuvre amongst the other Arctic actors. The following section explores this policy, highlighting how EU energy priorities in the Arctic have changed over time. Here, a particular point of emphasis is the changing attitude of the EU towards the management and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic.
The EU Energy Policy in the Arctic: A Climate Focus-Shift in 2016
Complementing and sometimes competing with the EU's climate objectives is the EU's energy policy in relation to the Arctic region. Looking at the 2016 Communication, it would appear that the focus of EU attention in energy matters in the Arctic has shifted. Even though the EU has a strategic interest in the oil and gas supply from the Arctic,65 the 2016 Communication focuses on renewable energy development, on the Green Economy and on the so-called Blue Economy. 66 As discussed, hydrocarbons are only mentioned in the integrated policy for the Arctic to promote the adoption of 'the highest standards of major accident prevention and environmental control' ,67 and there is no mention of the regulation of production and consumption of oil and gas from the Arctic region. The content of the 2016 Communication thus strikingly differs from preceding policy documents and represents an important focus shift in the policy priorities of EU in the Arctic. That being said, in analysing to what extent the EU is truly playing an assertive role in relation to energy and the Arctic, it is valuable to devote further attention to the EU's own domestic action in this field. The following section first explores the developments leading towards a greater climate focus in EU energy policy. The extent to which this shift is reflected in EU domestic policy is then analysed, with a focus on the 2013 Offshore Safety Directive, and the ways in which it indirectly extends its reach to the Arctic region. 68 The of the ND policy again places an emphasis on economic cooperation in the field of energy, the protection of the Arctic ecosystems, and cooperation in the field of climate change and environmental legislation.72 In parallel to this regional cooperation policy, the EU developed its Arctic policy where energy concerns were consolidated as one of the priorities for the region. In the 2008 Communication, energy production in the Arctic is part of two of three main policy objectives listed. 73 In particular the section dedicated to the second policy objective, namely the promotion of the sustainable use of resources, opens with a paragraph on 'Hydrocarbons' .74 Notably, the communication was adopted in the same year in which the US Geological Survey published its famous study in which it estimated that around 10% of world's undiscovered oil and gas resources might be located in the Arctic.75 Accordingly, as mentioned, the 2008 Communication affirms that 'Arctic resources could contribute to enhancing the EU's security of supply concerning energy' . 76 The Communication moreover states EU support for the exploitation of hydrocarbons 'in full respect of strict environmental standards taking into account the particular vulnerability of the Arctic' . 77 A similar position was expressed in the 2012 Communication, where the EU proclaimed in particular its role as a 'major destination of resources and goods from the Arctic region' . 78 The pursuit of high environmental standards and the protection of the vulnerable Arctic system was at that moment strengthened by the provisional observer status of the EU at the Arctic Council, and its contribution to the work of the Arctic Council's Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group. 79 The paragraph on the sustainable In its Resolution of 12 March 2014 on the EU strategy for the Arctic, the European Parliament put particular emphasis on the environmental concerns related to offshore oil and gas exploitation in the Arctic, and how the 2013 Directive provided a much-needed 'effective response' .84 Unfortunately, the 2013 Directive was not well received in the Arctic region.85 Not surprisingly, the 2016 Communication does not really address the EU Parliament's concerns about the safety of offshore oil and gas operations. There is only one reference to the 2013 Directive, in a footnote,86 as example of regulatory best practice that the EU is willing to share with its international partners in order to 'support the safety and preservation of the environment in the region' .87 Moreover, the section on the sustainable management of the region mentions the existence of hydrocarbons but does not pursue the discourse on their role for the EU energy security that we find in the preceding policy documents.
As highlighted above, the 2016 Communication gives voice to the developments which occurred in Paris in 2015 and to the imperatives of decarbonizing our economies. Consequently, its energy chapter focuses on development of renewable energy projects in the Arctic and seems to somewhat marginalize the oil and gas sector. This, however, cannot only be explained by the impact 80 Ibid., at p. 9. Drafted at a moment when hydrocarbons were still high on the agenda of the EU Arctic policy, the 2013 Offshore Safety Directive was the first piece of legislation specifically tackling the offshore oil and gas sector, and thus had to contain references to the Arctic. We highlight below how the Directive extends its reach to the Arctic region, even though it is not directly applicable to the Arctic waters. The Directive shows how the EU can push forward its policy objectives through secondary legislation, in this case in the energy sector, but perhaps in the future also in the field of climate change.
The Directive contains three different types of references to the Arctic region. First, it includes specific references to the Arctic waters. Second, it deals with transboundary situations which could potentially involve the Arctic region. Third, it encourages EU private economic actors to conduct their business responsibly also outside the EU territory, including in the Arctic waters. encouraged to actively promote the highest standards with regard to environmental safety (emphasis added).
Specific References to the
The EU thus reaffirms its proximity to the Arctic region in order to justify its interest in playing a role. This argument also underlies the EU concerns in potential transboundary situations, as is pointed out below, and pressures the three EU Arctic Member States, i.e., Finland, Sweden and Denmark,91 to promote EU policy within the Arctic Council. Paragraph 52 also stresses how the 'serious environmental concerns relating to the Arctic waters require special attention to ensure the environmental protection of the Arctic in relation to any offshore oil and gas operation, including exploration, taking into account the risk of major accidents and the need for effective response' . As discussed above, particularly in relation to natural gas, accidents and leakages during the extraction process may greatly contribute to the release of harmful GHGs. The protection of the Arctic waters is then a mitigation mechanism in itself, and thus a key EU objective in its climate leadership. Article 33 of the Directive on 'Coordinated approach towards the safety of offshore oil and gas operations at international level' then directly refers to the Arctic. This Article provides that the European Commission, in close collaboration with Member States, promotes cooperation with third countries 'that undertake offshore oil and gas operations in the same marine region' as Member States. This cooperation includes the exchange of information between the member state and the adjacent third states in order to 'promote preventive measures and regional emergency response plans' (para. 2). More specifically, '[t]he Commission shall promote high safety standards for offshore oil and gas operations at international level in relevant global and regional fora, including those relating to Arctic waters' (para. 3, emphasis added). It is important to underline that the European Commission is a Member of all sub-circumpolar councils, whereas the EU still has no direct role in the Arctic circumpolar cooperation on the Arctic Council. The EU has not obtained the formal status of permanent Observer of the Arctic Council yet.92 However, the 
EU Private Actors Operating in the Arctic
The Offshore Safety Directive advocates the need for a more active role of the industry in guaranteeing the safety of offshore platforms, in particular by better monitoring the construction and operation of the installations.99 It specifically affirms:
Best global practice requires licensees, operators and owners to take primary responsibility for controlling the risks they create by their operations, including operations conducted by contractors on their behalf and therefore to establish within a corporate major accident prevention policy the mechanisms and highest level of corporate ownership to implement that policy consistently.100
In Article 2(5), the Directive defines the operator as the 'entity appointed by the licensee or licensing authority to conduct offshore oil and gas operations, including planning and executing a well operation or managing and controlling the functions of a production installation' . It also defines the licensee, namely the 'holder or joint holders of a license' ,101 the contractor, i.e., an 'entity contracted by the operator or owner to perform specific tasks on behalf of the operator or owner' ,102 and the owner, i.e., 'an entity legally entitled to control the operation of a non-production installation' .103 Moreover, the same Directive translates into legal terms the concept of 'industry' , which consists of 'entities that are directly involved in offshore oil and gas operations covered by the Directive or whose activities are closely related to those operations' .104 This definition is novel and suggests a wide understanding of industry, which
